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IP NEUTRALITY AND BENEFIT SHARING FOR SEASONAL
FLU: AN ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF WHO PIP FRAMEWORK
EXPANSION
ARIELLE SLOAN

Abstract
Currently, countries that share samples of influenza viruses with a
global WHO network called GISRS can participate in IP and benefitsharing agreements over their samples only if those samples are
considered potential pandemic triggers. Some key players in public health
want to change that by extending those protections to seasonal flu viruses.
Others argue that doing so will be problematic, by, for example, creating
too much red tape for vaccine research and development or by destroying
the progress that has already been made in creating GISRS. In this battle
between WHO stakeholders, expanding the scope of IP and benefits
agreements to seasonal flu virus-donating countries will satisfy both
parties in the long term and save lives.
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INTRODUCTION
“I was on duty,” recalled James H. Wallace, “on Friday, September 13,
1918, when I was assigned to a ward of ‘flu’ patients. [The flu] had struck
the training station like a bomb and the 100,000 men there suddenly filled
up the hospital′s 3,000-beds . . . . The death rate was unbelievable, over 100
a day.”1 David Burke explained that his father “remembered that sometimes
the railroad station at Fort Devens would be stacked with the coffins of
recruits who had died from the flu.”2
The deaths that these men describe all sprang from the largest flu
pandemic of the modern age, which is marked in the annals of history as the
1. Jay McAuliffe, Dr. James H. Wallace, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/publications/panflu/stories/warstories_wallace.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2016).
2. David P. Burke, Paul J. Burke, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/publications/panflu/stories/warstories_burke.html (last updated June 3, 2014)
(quoting his father, Paul J. Burke).
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Spanish flu.3 Although it is unknown where the pandemic started,4 it spread
wildly through the ranks of soldiers fighting in the First World War.5 It is
believed that “about one-third of the planet’s population” was infected with
the flu during that time and that “more U.S. soldiers died from the 1918 flu
than were killed in battle during the war.”6
Since that horrific pandemic, several other potent flu virus strains have
swept across the globe and have taken their tolls on human life. In the 1950s,
for example, one flu pandemic killed about two million people, while another
in the 1960s claimed another million.7 Recently, from 2009 to 2010, another,
commonly known as “swine flu,” killed 14,000.8 Experts predict that another
flu pandemic is imminent.9
In preparing for the next flu pandemic, policymakers and researchers
around the world need to focus on an underestimated and strongly-related
threat: seasonal flu.10 International seasonal flu surveillance keeps the flu
vaccine industry alive between pandemic cycles, promotes the kind of
technological innovation and network-building that prepares the world for
pandemics, and helps mitigate the significant toll that seasonal flu takes on
public health and the economy.11
3. 1918 Flu Pandemic, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/1918-flu-pandemic (last visited
Nov. 14, 2016) [hereinafter 1918 Flu Pandemic].
4. Jennifer Latson, What Made the Spanish Flu so Deadly?, TIME (March 11, 2015),
http://time.com/3731745/spanish-flu-history/ (“Some researchers believe the story began on the morning
of . . . Mar. 11, 1918, when a soldier in Fort Riley, Kans., went to the camp infirmary with a fever.”).
5. Id.; 1918 Flu Pandemic, supra note 3.
6. 1918 Flu Pandemic, supra note 3.
7. Id.
8. Id.; Katherine Harmon, What Will the Next Influenza Pandemic Look Like?, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN (Sep. 19, 2011), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/next-influenza-pandemic/.
9. See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 8.
10. In many ways, seasonal flu is the overlooked step-sibling of pandemic influenza. It is common
and rarely lethal.
11. For example, it is estimated that seasonal flu has killed just as many individuals over the last
century as all of the major flu pandemics during the same time. Ab Osterhaus, Ron Fouchier & Guus
Rimmelzwaan, Towards Universal Influenza Vaccines?, 366 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. B. 2766, 2766 (2011).
Amazingly, by one estimate, there have been more deaths from seasonal flu even in specific years than
from individual flu pandemics. Peter Doshi, Trends in Recorded Influenza Mortality: United States,
1900–2004, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 939, 941 (2008) (“For example, the 1941–1942, 1942–1943, 1943–
1944, 1944–1945, 1945–1946, 1946–1947, and 1952–1953 nonpandemic seasons were all deadlier than
the 1957–1958 pandemic season.”). While there is some controversy surrounding the statistical modeling
of seasonal flu deaths, the debate over how best to model those deaths is beyond the scope of this paper.
Id. at 943. Even in its mildest form, seasonal flu often leads to medical visits, missed days of work and
lower work productivity among a large segment of the population, costing consumers and businesses
billions of dollars every year. See Noelle-Angelique M. Molinari et al., The Annual Impact of Seasonal
Influenza in the US: Measuring Disease Burden and Costs, 25 VACCINE 5086, 5093 tbl.5 (2007).
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Unfortunately, despite its potential benefits, seasonal flu research is
arguably partially dis-incentivized in international legal agreements. More
specifically, under a global research program run by the World Health
Organization (WHO), certain intellectual property safeguards only extend to
pandemic influenza viruses that are donated to its research network—not to
donated seasonal viruses.12 In May 2017, the World Health Assembly
adopted a decision that requires the Director General to study whether or not
to extend that framework, but it is unclear how long that will take.13 And
while there has at least been active debate in the area, with some participants
in support of the initiative14 and some against,15 one of the most important
perspectives to hear in this discussion about intellectual property—that is, an
intellectual property perspective—does not seem to have voiced a strong
opinion in the matter.
Some evidence suggests that attorneys have been influencing WHO
discussions on this topic from the inside, a possibility that has worried some
scientists who fear that attorneys have anti-public health biases.16 These fears
have some basis in reality: public health and intellectual property are
sometimes viewed as enemies or, at best, awkward allies in global
development work.17
However, not all intellectual property law perspectives run against
public health.18 The IP perspective offered in this article is based on the

Moreover, if seasonal flu mutates into a form that the human immune system cannot fight, it may spread
in pandemic-like fashion. See How the Flu Virus Can Change: “Drift” and “Shift,” CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/viruses/change.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2018).
12. See Catherine Saez, WHO Debates Expansion of Role In Virus-Sharing, INT. PROP. WATCH
(Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.ip-watch.org/2016/08/31/who-debates-expansion-of-role-in-virus-sharing/.
13. IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISION WHA70(10) 8(B): QUESTIONS & ANSWERS, WHO 3, 9 (2017).
The Director-General will issue a report on this study in May of 2018. Id. At 9. See generally REPORT OF
THE 2016 PIP FRAMEWORK REVIEW GROUP, REVIEW OF THE PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS
FRAMEWORK,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.,
(Dec.
29,
2016),
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB140/B140_16-en.pdf?ua=1.
14. Saez, supra note 12.
15. Id.; see generally discussion infra.
16. Catherine Saez, WHO Flu Pandemic Framework Working, Group Says; Some Concerned, INT.
PROP. WATCH (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.ip-watch.org/2016/08/30/who-flu-pandemic-frameworkworking-group-says-others-concerned/.
17. See, e.g., Susan K. Sell, The Quest for Global Governance in Intellectual Property and Public
Health: Structural, Discursive, and Institutional Dimensions, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 363, 363 (2004).
18. Generally, intellectual property perspectives need to take both business and scientific interests
into account, but in the virus and vaccine context, for example, some scholars may be split over what kind
of “science” is valuable in intellectual property policy considerations. Some may support the
advancement of the science behind improved vaccine-related technologies but not find as much value in
the science behind public health, which is also critical in vaccine discussions.
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simple premise that when people are healthy, they can devote less time to
sickness and more time to education, family, and work: a phenomenon
which, on a large scale, could translate into gains in economy, trade, and
innovation. The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of the seasonal
flu network debate through this pro-public health intellectual property lens
and explain how extending WHO contractual protection to seasonal flu
viruses can protect scientific innovation, public health, and business interests
in the long run.
In order to make this argument that WHO’s viral exchange legal
protections should extend to seasonal flu viruses, I will provide an
introduction to seasonal flu and describe its effect on global health and
economy in Part II. I will then discuss the structure of WHO’s virus network
and the legal protections that the program provides to pandemic flu virus
donor countries in Part III. In Part IV, I will analyze the policy debate on
extending that protection to seasonal virus donor countries and explain why
the extension arguments are stronger. In Part V, I will discuss considerations
that the WHO should take into account if it does eventually decide to extend
legal protection to seasonal flu. In Part VI, I will conclude.
I.

AN INTRODUCTION TO SEASONAL FLU

In a 2015 flu shot commercial, an office birthday party is depicted in
which a middle-aged male employee is told to make a wish before blowing
out birthday candles.19 He does so and then proceeds to involuntarily cough
and sneeze all over the top of the cake.20 His act leaves his cake-loving coworker in a quandary over whether or not she should eat a slice.21
This comical portrayal of seasonal flu illustrates a hyperbolic, but
perhaps, partially accurate, American perception of this illness: no one wants
to get the flu, but a germ-infested cake might be worth the risk. This
sentiment toward the flu makes sense, of course: for the majority of
Americans, the seasonal flu that comes around every winter may necessitate
a few weeks of bed rest, but the experience is rarely life-threatening.

19. See Rite Aid TV Commercial, ‘Janet Loves Cake’, ISPOT.TV (Dec. 12, 2015),
https://www.ispot.tv/ad/AkDL/rite-aid-janet-loves-cake (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
20. Id.
21. Id.
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Considering the low death rate22 attributable to seasonal flu and the attitude
that the general American population has toward it, then, it is important to
understand what seasonal influenza is and how it impacts health.
A. An Epidemiological Snapshot of Seasonal Influenza
Seasonal influenza is an extremely common illness. According to one
estimate, seasonal influenza spreads to about a quarter of all children and
five to ten percent of adults every year.23 The spread of this illness, which is
caused by a contagious virus, peaks in winter in colder climates and
experiences more sporadic cycles in warmer climates.24 Seasonal influenza
has a stronger effect on vulnerable populations, including pregnant women,
the elderly, children, and individuals with serious health conditions.25
B. The Influenza Virus
Seasonal influenza is caused by invasive packaged genetic material,
also known as a virus.26 When flu viruses enter the human body, they use
host cells to replicate themselves27 and can contribute to host cell selfdestruction.28 Between losing cells and experiencing the activation of their
own immune systems,29 flu sufferers start to feel the effects of a flu virus
invasion in short order: fever, sore throat, headaches and muscle aches, for
example.30
22. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Seasonal Influenza, More Information,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/qa/disease.htm#people (last updated Oct. 12, 2017) (“[I]n the United States
[generally,] millions of people become ill, hundreds of thousands are hospitalized and thousands or tens
of thousands of people die from flu every year.”).
23. World Health Org., H5N1 Avian Influenza: First Steps Towards Development of a Human
Vaccine,
33
WKLY.
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL
REC.
277,
281
(Aug.
19,
2005),
http://www.who.int/wer/2005/wer8033.pdf.
24. Influenza
(Seasonal),
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs211/en/ (last updated Jan. 2018).
25. Id.
26. Peter M. Crosta, Viruses: An Introduction, MED. NEWS TODAY (July 11, 2016),
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/158179.php.
27. Craig Freudenrich, How Viruses Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS SCI. (Oct. 19, 2000),
http://science.howstuffworks.com/life/cellular-microscopic/virus-human3.htm.
28. See generally S. Tripathi et al., Influenza A Virus Nucleoprotein Induces Apoptosis in Human
Airway Epithelial Cells: Implications of a Novel Interaction Between Nucleoprotein and Host Protein
Clustering, 4 CELL DEATH & DISEASE 562 (2013).
29. See Freudenrich, supra note 27.
30. Key Facts About Influenza (Flu), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREV.,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/keyfacts.htm (last accessed Oct. 13, 2016).
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In expelling the flu virus from one’s system, an individual may,
naturally, cough or sneeze,31 sending virus particles hurtling toward other
individuals who, then, will similarly have to fight off viral invasion.32 The
severity of that invasion will depend on the virus’ interplay with the human
immune system: when a virus is weak or the immune system is strong, viral
spreading will do little damage. However, for some individuals with weak
immune systems, the flu virus can cause deadly complications, like
pneumonia.33 For the same reason, people in many lower- and middleincome countries, where nutrition and healthcare are less-readily accessible,
are susceptible to seasonal flu.34
When a virus mutates in a way that the human immune system cannot
defeat, that virus has more lethal potential.35 Viruses that shift from animal
species to human species, for example, are said to have this potential because
human immune systems are not used to their mode of operation.36 In cases
like these, especially strong flu viruses can cause international disease
outbreaks, also known as pandemics.37
The primary difference then, between seasonal and pandemic influenza
is, in some ways, just a matter of degree. It is true that some flu virus strains
may be considered less prone to mutation than others.38 However, in theory,
any virus can mutate radically into a form that humans cannot fight off, and
this mutation can result in another Spanish flu.39 Consequently, it is of vital
importance to monitor and research as many viral strains as possible.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Freudenrich, supra note 27.
Key Facts About Influenza (Flu), supra note 30.
Id.
See Influenza (Seasonal), supra note 24.
See How the Flu Virus Can Change: “Drift” and “Shift”, supra note 11.
See Transmission of Influenza Viruses from Animals to People, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/viruses/transmission.htm (last updated Aug. 19, 2014)
(“Antigenic shift results when a new influenza A subtype to which most people have little or no immune
protection infects humans. If this new virus causes illness in people and can spread easily from person to
person, an influenza pandemic can occur.”).
37. What
is
a
Pandemic?,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.
(Feb.
24,
2010),
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/frequently_asked_questions/pandemic/en/.
38. See generally Eri Nobusawa & Katsuhiko Sato, Comparison of the Mutation Rates of Human
Influenza A and B Viruses, 80 J. VIROLOGY 3675 (2006).
39. See supra Part I.
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C. The Influenza Vaccine
Seasonal flu viruses can be used to produce flu vaccines, which are a
primary prevention tool used to combat the flu. If a viral infection could be
considered a test of an immune system’s strength, a vaccine could be
considered a practice exam. Vaccines often consist of toxins or weakened,
partial, or dead viruses that the body can learn to fight against without the
threat of being taken over.40 Once the immune system learns to fend off a
certain viral strain, that knowledge sticks with the immune system: a
knowledge that enables it to quickly conquer the actual virus upon
invasion.41
Vaccination has been called “the most cost-effective way to reduce [the
seasonal flu] disease burden,”42 and due to the impact that vaccination has
on population health, vaccine use boosts the economy as well. After all, the
flu vaccine prevents deaths and hospitalizations, but it also reduces lost work
days.43 According to one estimate, if 75% of individuals recommended to
receive the seasonal flu vaccine in twenty-seven European countries actually
did so, 1.6 to 1.7 million more individuals would avoid the flu, about 10,000
deaths would be avoided, and about a million lost days of work would be
recouped.44 Such public health gains would translate to an estimated €200
million in combined annual savings.45
D. Seasonal influenza antiviral drugs
Seasonal influenza viral material can also be used to develop antiviral
drugs. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) views
antiviral drugs as “a second line of defense to treat [seasonal] flu.”46 While
a flu shot prevents an individual from developing the flu, antiviral drugs can

40. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, UNDERSTANDING HOW VACCINES WORK 1–2
(2013),
https://web.archive.org/web/20150213181503/http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/patiented/conversations/downloads/vacsafe-understand-color-office.pdf.
41. See id.
42. Osterhaus, Fouchier & Rimmelzwaan, supra note 11, at 2766.
43. PREAUD ET AL., ANNUAL PUBLIC HEALTH AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF SEASONAL INFLUENZA
VACCINATION:
A
EUROPEAN
ESTIMATE
1,
8
(2014),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4141103/pdf/12889_2013_Article_6962.pdf.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. What You Should Know About Flu Antiviral Drugs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (last updated Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/antivirals/whatyoushould.htm.
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shorten the duration of sickness and make symptoms more bearable.47 In
doing so, antiviral drugs, like vaccines, can contribute to public health gains
and cost savings by decreasing sick days, hospitalizations, and deaths.48
E. The impact of seasonal flu research on pandemic flu research
By researching and developing seasonal flu vaccines and antivirals, of
course, scientists do not simply protect populations from seasonal flu: they
also prepare the world for pandemic flu by keeping vaccine manufacturers
financially afloat and by advancing flu research generally. Kenneth McLean
and colleagues explain that “[i]f influenza immunization rates stagnate or
drop[,] this could result in manufacturers reducing or stopping their seasonal
vaccine production [and] impact the global capacity for pandemic influenza
vaccines.”49 In other words, deceasing seasonal flu vaccine sales could hurt
pandemic flu preparedness both by reducing annual vaccine manufacturer
profits and by slowing down flu research.
Moreover, because seasonal influenza strains are similar to and could
theoretically become pandemic strains through mutation,50 technologies that
scientists develop around seasonal influenza often have direct application to
pandemic flu. For example, WHO once listed a seasonal flu vaccine
technology as one of the “most promising avenues for short and medium
term development of pandemic influenza vaccines.”51 Without seasonal
influenza research and technology, our level of pandemic flu preparedness
could weaken significantly.
II.

WHO’S RESEARCH DATABASE

It is in this context—knowing how similar seasonal and pandemic
influenza truly are and how seasonal flu research can prepare the world for
pandemic flu—that we approach the question of how WHO’s flu research
system currently handles seasonal flu viruses.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. Kenneth A. McLean et al., The 2015 Global Production Capacity of Seasonal and Pandemic
Influenza Vaccine, 34 VACCINE 5410, 5412 (2016).
50. REVIEW OF THE PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS FRAMEWORK FOR THE SHARING OF
INFLUENZA VIRUSES AND ACCESS TO VACCINES AND OTHER BENEFITS, PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
PREPAREDNESS FRAMEWORK REVIEW GROUP, § 3.2.1 (2016) [hereinafter PIP FRAMEWORK REVIEW].
51. Questions and Answers on Pandemic Influenza Vaccine, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 9, 2007),
http://www.who.int/immunization/newsroom/PI_QAs/en/.
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Currently, the structure of WHO’s research network, also known as the
Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS), only provides
certain legal protections to countries that donate flu virus strains with
“pandemic potential.”52 Before delving into the debate on whether or not
seasonal flu should also receive these protections, I will discuss the origins
of this system and how it currently operates.
A. GISN and the Indonesian Avian Flu Revolt of 2007
The international flu monitoring system we know today as the GISRS
has been in existence since 1952, although it was originally called the Global
Influenza Surveillance Network, or GISN.53 The purpose of this system is to
monitor virus mutations and alert global leaders when pandemics are likely
to occur.54 The system operates in part by bringing seasonal and pandemic
flu virus strains from around the world to WHO-affiliated labs and
manufacturers, who conduct research on these strains and then develop
vaccines and antivirals to combat them.55
Although the network operated successfully for over half a century, an
incident related to Avian flu in 2007 created a need for GISN overhaul.
During that year, the nation of Indonesia withheld one of its Avian flu strains
from WHO’s flu database, choosing instead to work with a pharmaceutical
company to produce a vaccine for it.56
The nation explained that it was doing so in part because it was angry
with WHO.57 According to one report, “Indonesia blamed the World Health
Organization . . . for the government’s decision to stop sharing samples of
the H5N1 bird flu virus, claiming that the United Nations agency passed

52. Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS), WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/influenza/gisrs_laboratory/en/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
53. Id.; TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR NATIONAL INFLUENZA CENTERS OF THE GLOBAL INFLUENZA
SURVEILLANCE
AND
RESPONSE
SYSTEM,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.
1
(2017),
http://www.who.int/influenza/gisrs_laboratory/national_influenza_centres/tor_nic.pdf.
54. Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS), supra note 52.
55. WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) Surveillance and Vaccine
Development, WHO COLLABORATING CNTR. FOR REFERENCE & RES. ON INFLUENZA,
http://www.influenzacentre.org/centre_GISRS.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
56. David P. Fidler, Indonesia’s Decision to Withhold Influenza Virus Samples from the World
Health Organization: Implications for International Law, ASIL INSIGHTS (Feb. 28, 2007),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/11/issue/4/indonesias-decision-withhold-influenza-virus-samplesworld-health.
57. Id.
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them on to pharmaceutical companies to make vaccines that Jakarta had to
buy at high prices.”58
Two reactions emerged out of Indonesia’s radical move: one was fear
that other countries might follow Indonesia’s lead and keep their viruses to
themselves as “sovereign property.”59 Another was anger at WHO for
turning the GISN network into a “virus vacuum:” taking viruses from poor
countries and allowing wealthy industries to patent and/or profit from the
results for free without giving back.60 After all, Indonesia’s experience was
not an isolated incident. When Avian flu struck Mexico in 2009, wealthy
countries took the virus strain that Mexico donated into vaccines and took
care of their own populations before turning back to Mexico.61 In fact,
although ninety-five WHO-partnering countries did not have a way to get
vaccines on their own during that pandemic, only two received WHO aid
within ten months of the first reported cases.62
So, really, the Indonesian Avian flu experience highlighted two major
problems with the GISN: first, there was no intellectual property framework
that regulated how viral material could be used by WHO laboratories or
manufacturers, and second, there was little incentive for wealthy
manufacturers to “give back” to donors in any way.
B. The GISRS and the PIP Framework
These kinds of experiences prompted negotiations between WHO and
partner countries to overhaul the virus sharing network, with a dual focus on
intellectual property ownership of viral resources and equitable sharing of
benefits. As a result of these negotiations, WHO created a new legal model

58. Id. (quoting John Aglionby & Andrew Jack, Indonesia Accuses WHO of Misusing Flu Sample,
FIN. TIMES (Feb, 8, 2007, 2:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e565960c-b719-11db-8bc20000779e2340.html?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true#axzz4SrQvQzuW).
59. Richard Holbrooke & Laurie Garett, ‘Sovereignty’ That Risks Global Health, WASH. POST
(Aug.
10,
2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/08/08/AR2008080802919.html.
60. See Edward Hammond, Indonesia Fights to Change WHO Rules on Flu Vaccines, GRAIN (Apr.
18,
2009),
https://www.grain.org/article/entries/761-indonesia-fights-to-change-who-rules-on-fluvaccines.
61. Charles Lawson, Who Shall Live When Not All Can Live? Intellectual Property in Accessing
and Benefit-Sharing Influenza Viruses Through the World Health Organisation, 18 J.L.M. 554, 574
(2011).
62. Id. (citing Chan Chee Khoon, Equitable Access to Pandemic Flu Vaccines, THIRD WORLD
NETWORK
INFO
SERV.
ON
INT.
PROP.
ISSUES
(Mar.
2010),
http://www.twn.my/title2/intellectual_property/info.service/2010/ipr.info.100311.htm.).
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for virus sharing in WHO’s flu database, also known as the Pandemic
Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework,63 and changed its network name
from GISN to the “Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System”
(GISRS).64
The main goal of this new PIP Framework was to improve GISRS65 by
giving countries an assurance that they would be able to benefit in some way
for sharing their viral information with WHO.66 As noted by WHO, “[t]he
PIP Framework aims to improve . . . the [GISRS] so it is more fair,
transparent, equitable, efficient, and effective in facilitating the sharing of
influenza viruses with pandemic potential and [in] increasing . . . access to
pandemic influenza vaccines and other benefits.”67 In order to build a more
open-access virus community and support vaccine technology benefits
sharing, the PIP Framework utilizes a contract system68 that prevents viral
material from being patented and provides partner countries (or WHO
generally) with certain benefits.69 This contract system operates through two
separate agreements, also known as Standard Material Transfer Agreements
1 and 2 (SMTAs 1 and 2).70
SMTA 1 is an agreement made among WHO laboratories to facilitate
open-access virus sharing.71 Under this agreement, laboratories that donate
viruses to the network promise to handle those viruses according to
established WHO and safety guidelines.72 In exchange, the laboratories that
receive those viruses promise to involve donor laboratories in their research

63. David P. Fidler & Lawrence O. Gostin, WHO Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework:
A Milestone in Global Governance for Health, 306 JAMA 200, 200 (2011).
64. Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS), supra note 52.
65. Fidler & Gostin, supra note 63, at 201 (describing the PIP Framework as improving the
“legitimacy” of the system).
66. Id. at 200.
67. PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS FRAMEWORK FOR THE SHARING OF INFLUENZA
VIRUSES AND ACCESS TO VACCINES AND OTHER BENEFITS (“PIP FRAMEWORK”): QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.
3
(Sep.
2011),
http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/PIP_FQA_Nov_2011.pdf. [hereinafter WHO, PIP FRAMEWORK
Q&A].
68. Fidler & Gostin, supra note 63, at 201.
69. PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS FRAMEWORK Q&AS, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 3,
http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/QA_Flyer.pdf (2016).
70. PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS FRAMEWORK FOR THE SHARING OF INFLUENZA
VIRUSES AND ACCESS TO VACCINES AND OTHER BENEFITS, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 29–32 (2011)
[hereinafter WHO, PIP Framework].
71. Id. at 29–36.
72. Id. at 30.
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and acknowledge donor laboratories if that research leads to publishable or
presentation-worthy scientific findings.73 Finally, both donors and recipients
promise, very simply, that they will not “seek to obtain any intellectual
property rights” on donated viral material.74 This agreement does not extend
to IP rights obtained on material before the PIP Framework was adopted—
rather, those prior rights are left intact, and so are any IP-backed technologies
involved in preparing donor material.75
SMTA 2 is a benefit sharing agreement that WHO can make with nonWHO entities, such as vaccine and antiviral manufacturers.76 Under the
agreement, WHO gives a flu virus to a manufacturer in exchange for certain
benefits.77 Manufacturers can choose which benefits they’d like to provide
to WHO: some of the options include “donat[ing] at least 10% of real time
pandemic vaccine production to WHO,” selling the same amount to WHO at
low cost, or “[g]rant[ing] to manufacturers in developing countries licenses
on mutually agreed terms that should be fair and reasonable.”78
Manufacturers are also required to “consider” other good-will offers, like
donating vaccines, transferring technology, and providing WHO with
sublicenses for its intellectual property.79
If a vaccine manufacturer wants to license its vaccine-related
intellectual property to low- or middle-income countries (“LMICs”) under
this agreement, it can do so in several ways. By one method, the
manufacturer can contract directly with a developing country and receive
royalties under mutual terms, as long as those terms are “fair and
reasonable.”80 In determining what is fair and reasonable, the contracting
parties are supposed to consider factors like the developing country’s
technological advancement and already-held intellectual property rights in
the vaccine field.81 Under the second option, the manufacturer can opt to
grant licenses to LMICs or to WHO directly, who can then sublicense certain

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 30–31, art. 5.2–5.3.
Id. at 31, art. 6.1.
Id. at 31, art. 6.2–6.3.
Id. at 33–36.
Id. at 33–35.
Id. at 34, art. 4.1.1(A).
Id. at 35, art. 4.1.1(C).
Id. at 34, art. 4.1.1(A5).
Id.
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vaccine-related technology to LMICs.82 In either case, manufacturers who
choose to license their IP must report to WHO on how their license
agreements are coming along.83
In summary, the PIP Framework is important because it provides
industries with an assurance that pandemic flu viruses will remain open
access, and it gives donating countries the knowledge that when pandemics
strike, WHO will be able to provide them with vaccines or relevant
technology to fight back.
III.

TO EXTEND OR NOT TO EXTEND: THAT IS THE DEBATE

The PIP Framework is currently undergoing a review, and in these
review meetings, stakeholders have raised several issues with the GISRS
system.84 One of these issues is that the PIP Framework only covers
pandemic influenza85 even though seasonal influenza viruses are also
donated to GISRS.86 Directly expanding the framework to cover seasonal
influenza87 is one of three alternatives on the table; stakeholders have also

82. Id. at 34, art. 4.1.1(A6).
83. Id. at 34, art. 4.1.1 (“Where Option 5 or 6 is selected, the Recipient shall regularly provide to
WHO information on granted licenses and the status of implementation of the licensing agreement. WHO
shall provide such information to the Advisory Group.”).
84. Catherine Saez, Review of WHO Pandemic Flu Preparedness: Data Sequencing And Other
Issues, INT. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.ip-watch.org/2016/03/31/review-of-whopandemic-flu-preparedness-data-sequencing-and-other-issues/ [hereinafter Saez, Review of Pandemic
Flu].
85. Id.
86. WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) Surveillance and Vaccine
Development, supra note 55. It should be noted that seasonal influenza vaccine work is indirectly involved
in GISRS and the PIP Framework. For example, GISRS spending covers both pandemic and seasonal
influenza laboratory research, and companies are required to donate money to GISRS that is proportionate
to both pandemic and seasonal influenza “product sales.” IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISION
WHA70(10)8(B) SCOPING PAPER ON APPROACHES TO SEASONAL INFLUENZA AND GENETIC SEQUENCE
DATA UNDER THE PIP FRAMEWORK (“SCOPING PAPER”), WORLD HEALTH ORG. ¶ 24 (Oct. 2017),
http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/scopingpaper.pdf [hereinafter SCOPING PAPER].
87. In theory, direct incorporation might be as simple as making three changes: first, the line “[t]his
Framework does not apply to seasonal influenza” would need to be struck from the agreement; second,
the definition of “[i]nfluenza virus with human pandemic potential” would need to include seasonal
influenza viruses; and third, SMTA 2—the benefits sharing contract—would need to include a section
where vaccine manufacturers chose to provide WHO with one of a list of seasonal flu vaccine benefits.
See WHO, PIP FRAMEWORK Q&A, supra note 67, at 7, 9, 33–35. However, that section could
theoretically be copied from the pandemic influenza benefits sharing section, by, for example, allowing
companies to donate a fraction of their seasonal flu vaccines to LMICs. Id. at 33–35. The language of
every other provision in the agreement could likely remain the same. In doing so, the entire PIP
Framework would cover seasonal and pandemic influenza. However, if extension were chosen,
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discussed the creation of a parallel agreement that covers seasonal influenza
only and the allowance of seasonal influenza coverage under a separate
international agreement called the Nagoya Protocol.88 In this paper, the term
“framework expansion” will be used primarily to indicate direct expansion
of the framework, but I do not oppose a parallel agreement or an
interpretation of the Nagoya Protocol that would preserve benefit sharing
and IP considerations inherent in the PIP Framework.
The question of whether or not to expand benefit sharing and IP
protection generally is being heavily debated: drafting language in an
agreement is one thing, but implementing it is another, and there are many
arguments for and against extension at WHO. On one side of the debate,
WHO reviewers89 and the Gates Foundation have voiced support for research
into Framework extension.90 On the other side, a variety of groups, including
the pharmaceutical industry,91 the Third World Network,92 and GISAID,93
have opposed extension. Still others, including a representative of WHO
Collaborating Centre, once urged to look into the possibility with caution.94
In this Part, I will discuss several arguments for and against extension and
explain why the arguments in favor of extension are superior as a matter of
innovation, economy, and public health.
A. Industry Argument 1: Too Much Red Tape
At the August 29, 2016 PIP Framework review meeting, a
representative of pharmaceutical giant Sanofi Pasteur asked that the PIP
stakeholders could, naturally, carve out a section in the new framework with exceptions and new
requirements for seasonal influenza sharing specifically.
88. SCOPING PAPER, supra note 86, at ¶ 26.
89. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS, PIP FRAMEWORK REVIEW GROUP 2016, 3 (Aug. 19, 2016),
http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/2016-review/pip_review_group_prelim_findings.pdf?ua=1
(discussing framework expansion).
90. Saez, Review of Pandemic Flu, supra note 84.
91. Catherine Saez, WHO Debates Expansion of Role In Virus-Sharing, INT. PROP. WATCH (Aug.
31,
2016),
http://www.ip-watch.org/2016/08/31/who-debates-expansion-of-role-in-virus-sharing/
[hereinafter Saez, WHO Debates Role].
92. Saez, Review of Pandemic Flu, supra note 84.
93. GISAID, GISAID’S COMMENTS ON THE PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF THE PIP FRAMEWORK
REVIEW GROUP 2016, 1 (2016).
94. Saez, WHO Debates Role, supra note 91. But see The Inclusion of Seasonal Influenza Viruses
and Genetic Sequence Data (GSD) in the Context of the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP)
Framework, http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/CC_ERL_DirectorsPositionPaper_8b.pdf (last visited
Feb. 21, 2018) (in which the directors of that group, but not the group itself, took a position against
expansion).
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Framework not be extended to seasonal flu because extension could
“[require] obligation[s] that ha[d] already been committed by the third
parties . . . for example industry, . . . to be revised . . . [and] add another layer
of . . . complexity.”95 Another industry representative agreed with those
assertions without providing much added detail.96 However, at one point
during her comments, she did state her group’s belief that “the
contribution[s] provided the industry . . . ha[d] been sufficient.”97 Others
have noted that companies already provide funding to GISRS based in part
on seasonal flu vaccine sales.98
These comments seem to suggest that manufacturers view the PIP
Framework generally as a burden and an extension of that burden as
unreasonable. This suggestion is made stronger by the fact that, even under
the current PIP Framework, very few manufacturers have even signed onto
the SMTA 2 provisions.99 The reasons for this sentiment, of course, are
understandable: being asked to donate ten percent of a vaccine supply to
WHO during a pandemic, transfer technology to a developing nation, or
produce low-cost intellectual property licensing agreements, for example,
are not small financial or logistical matters.
Although the red tape concerns of industry are certainly understandable,
expanding the PIP Framework to include seasonal influenza could lower
some very thick red tape in the long run. Generally speaking, seasonal
influenza patenting is already something of a free-for-all:100 a situation that
can lead to patent thickets,101 tight control over virus-related material (and,
consequently, the vaccines that are made of viral material) by certain
corporations, and expensive licensing agreements that hinder competition.

95. Saez, WHO Debates Role, supra note 91; 2016 Review of the PIP Framework Webcast, WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (Aug. 29, 2016), http://who.int/influenza/pip/2016-review/webcasts/en/ [hereinafter
WHO, 2016 Review Webcast] (starting at minute 46:52).
96. WHO, 2016 Review Webcast, supra note 95, at 53:20.
97. Id. at 49:32.
98. See SCOPING PAPER, supra note 86, at 5.
99. WHO, 2016 Review Webcast, supra note 95, at 1:17:28.
100. This kind of situation has happened before. Antonio Regalado, Scientists’ Hunt for SARS Cure
Turns to Race for Patent Rights, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB105209016979730900
(last updated May 5, 2003, 3:41 PM).
101. See generally Dana Beldiman, Patent Choke Points in the Influenza-Related Medicines
Industry: Can Patent Pools Provide Balanced Access?, 15 TUL. J. TECH. & INT. PROP. 31 (2012). This
article is particularly interesting because it criticizes the current framework for not protecting IP rights
enough. See id. generally. However, in this article, I suggest that minimum protections for seasonal flu
are better than nothing, which is the current standard.
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According to Martin Friede, who leads WHO’s Technology Transfer
Initiative,102 about 10,000 patent applications have been filed for vaccines in
the past two decades, and many patent-holding entities want royalties from
manufacturers.103 And, as Dana Beldiman explains, “[d]epending on the
density of the thicket (number of patents to be licensed, economic and
political dynamics among the players, etc.) it is possible that none of the
players [in influenza medicine manufacturing] will be able to assemble all
the requisite rights to a product.”104
The PIP Framework’s prohibition on patenting donated material may
appear to cover only a small piece of the potential thicket pie. However, this
kind of prohibition is an important check on the unleashing of epidemics.105
All it takes is for one country, like Indonesia in 2007, to give one of its own
manufacturers exclusive rights to develop a vaccine on a virus. Or for a
country, like China in 2002, to keep a virus a complete secret from the world
until the virus spreads to neighboring countries.106 Or for researchers, like
several in Canada in 2003, to try to patent a virus and consider charging
royalties downstream.107
Although none of these historical events led to public health
catastrophes, and seasonal flu strains can mutate quickly, it would be unwise
for us to push our luck in the future by allowing patent ownership of material
closely linked to donated seasonal viruses by WHO-affiliated laboratories.
If the PIP Framework is not extended to seasonal flu, the seasonal flu vaccine
world could be primed for further patent thicketing, vaccine monopolization,
and industry stifling and put a chokehold on seasonal vaccine development.

102. Catherine Saez, Access to Vaccines, Patents Growing Concerns, Panelists Say, INT. PROP.
WATCH (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/06/10/access-to-vaccines-patents-growingconcerns-panellists-say/ [hereinafter Saez, Access to Vaccines].
103. Id.
104. See Beldiman, supra note 102, at 47 (emphasis added).
105. A technical paper from the Life Sciences Program at the World Intellectual Property
Organization voiced a similar concern about pandemic flu before PIP Framework extensions were
extended to it. See WORKING PAPER: PATENT ISSUES RELATED TO INFLUENZA VIRUSES AND THEIR GENES,
LIFE SCIENCES PROGRAM, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG. 1, 4 (2007),
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/policy/en/global_health/pdf/influenza.pdf (“Relatively few
patents or patent applications claim bare H5N1 genetic material as such, although some cases exist and
may require closer examination, since they could constrain wider downstream usage of the genetic
material claimed, such as in the development of new vaccines or production of vaccines.”).
106. Holbrooke & Garrett, supra note 59 (referring to the SARS virus).
107. Regalado, supra note 100.
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Extending the PIP Framework as a whole to seasonal influenza might
create red tape for industry, building a network of non-patentable seasonal
flu viruses through PIP Framework extension might be worth the extra
hassle.
B. Industry Argument 2: Extension Incentivizes ‘Handout’
Culture for Seasonal Flu Preparedness
Among some companies, there may be a sentiment that LMICs simply
need to develop their own vaccines108 rather than rely on free seasonal flu
vaccines or technology transfer from SMTA 2 agreements. As of 2002,
fourteen companies on a WHO task force were producing 90% of the world’s
flu vaccines,109 and many large pharmaceutical companies are located in
higher-income nations.110 Disparities in research and development mirror
geographic disparities in wealth: “companies [in high-income countries]
devote between 15 and 20 percent of their profit to R&D, [while those in
lower-income countries devote] 2 or 3 percent.”111
The sentiment that manufacturers in developed countries dislike sharing
seasonal flu resources with LMICs is suggested by the fact that companies
that have signed SMTA agreements have already been reluctant to
participate in developing country tech transfer for pandemic flu.112 Although
this reluctance may stem from a number of factors, such as feasibility
concerns, companies likely also fear the loss of their patented inventions or
trade secrets113 to groups that have not put in the work to develop them on
their own.
It is unknown how many vaccine manufacturers are opposed to PIP
Framework expansion on the ground that they already feel they are doing

108. Id.
109. VACCINES FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 9 (Nov. 12, 2004),
http://www.who.int/influenza/resources/documents/WHO_CDS_CSR_GIP_2004_3.pdf.
110. Id. at 14–16.
111. Saez, Access to Vaccines, supra note 102.
112. PIP FRAMEWORK REVIEW GROUP 2016, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 7 (Aug. 19, 2016),
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/PIP-Review-Group-PreliminaryFindings-August-2016.pdf.
113. Id.; Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer, INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sres/tectran/index.php?idp=202 (last
visited Feb. 16, 2018) (“A major requirement for successful agreement in technology transfer is the
guarantee of intellectual property rights (IPR). Without an IPR law that is effectively enforced, there is
little incentive for private companies to share their technology.”).
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more than their fair share. However, this argument, however justified,
appears to suggest that those in LMICs are simply lazy. Although nations
have difficulty developing their own vaccine networks for many reasons,
none of those are reasons why they should be ignored. To a much greater
extent than wealthier countries, for example, LMICs are constantly trying to
combat ubiquitous poverty, severe illness, poor educational systems,
sustainable resource issues, and unstable or unsafe social and political
climates.114 If anything, the fact that developing nations have bigger fish to
fry than seasonal influenza should morally compel companies in wealthier
nations to share seasonal influenza vaccine benefits.
However, if that rationale isn’t enough to persuade a company to
expand benefits sharing to seasonal influenza, the business potential of
investing in developing companies should. Stanley Plotkin explains that the
vaccine industry is in danger, presumably due to high costs of production
and patent thicketing, and notes that “fewer companies are developing
vaccines.”115 One thing that smaller members of the vaccine industry could
hypothetically do to survive is develop global partnerships through mutual,
low-cost licensing and sharing of technology, and the SMTA 2 agreement
facilitates these kinds of deals for pandemic flu. Extending that framework
to seasonal flu could help the industry become more collaborative and
profitable overall by creating stronger international benefits-sharing
networks.
C. Industry Argument 3: We Want Our Patents
A related problem that industry might have with extending the
Framework is that extension would limit industry’s ability to patent seasonal
viruses.116 This would be less of an argument for manufacturers than for
114. Many of these issues are directly discussed in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, UNITED NATIONS, A/RES/70/1, 14
(Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E.
115. Saez, Access to Vaccines, supra note 102 (quoting Saez in her discussion of Plotkin’s
commentary).
116. The literature has not focused much on this specific issue, perhaps because WHO-participating
labs have not done much patenting in this arena in the past, there is little research on current patenting
behavior, or it has been hard to trace such activity. See generally Amy Kapczynski, Order Without
Intellectual Property Law: Open Science in Influenza, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1539, 1618–20 (2017).
However, outside laws or agreements notwithstanding, if seasonal influenza were under the PIP
Agreement, SMTA 1’s non-patenting standards would apply to it. This issue has been discussed in
relation to genetic sequence data, however, which could be used to develop vaccines generally. See, e.g.,
IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISION WHA70(10) 8(B) EVIDENCE FOR “SCOPING PAPER ON APPROACHES TO
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WHO-participating research laboratories, because only laboratories sign the
intellectual property agreement that restricts viral patenting.117
The notion that a virus can be patented may seem odd for some readers,
but it is, in fact, an option in many countries.118 The patentability of viruses
in the United States has recently come under debate, but in certain ways,
virus-related material has been patentable for years in our country119 and in
others.120 Dana Beldiman explains that some courts “have viewed isolated
genes as [distinct] from what exists in nature and considered them patent
eligible. Other jurisdictions view isolated genes as patentable even if they
are similar to what exists in nature, albeit only if a specific useful function
can be articulated.”121
Patenting viral material helps industries to safeguard their own research
and increase their profits by, for example, licensing out their products for a
fee.122 And in the case of seasonal influenza, where manufacturers may work
with only slightly different virus strains each year, holding broad patents on
virus-related material could protect research even as viruses change.123 The

PIP FRAMEWORK” (“SCOPING PAPER”)
A17 (2017), http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/seasonalcompilation.pdf?ua=1 [hereinafter EVIDENCE
FOR SCOPING PAPER].
117. See supra Section III.B.
118. See
Andre
Mayer,
Can
You
Patent
a
Disease?,
CBC
NEWS,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/health/can-you-patent-a-disease-1.1355379 (last updated June 12, 2013).
119. The United States, for example, holds a patent on the Ebola Virus. See Human Ebola Virus
Species and Compositions and Methods Thereof, U.S. Patent No. 2012/0251502 A1 (issued Oct. 4, 2012).
120. Claudio Chiarolla, Intellectual Property Rights and Benefit Sharing from Marine Genetic
Resources in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: Current Discussions and Regulatory Options, 4
QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 171, 176–77 (2014). (“In the United States, three categories of inventions
are non-patentable: laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas [based on the ‘Product of nature
doctrine’]. The boundaries of such doctrine are routinely tested in disputes that concern the patentability
of DNA and its alleged positive or stifling effects on biological innovation. In addition to the United
States, Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore and the 18 Member States of the African Regional
Intellectual Property Organization generally allow full patentability of animals, plants and biological
processes without particular restrictions.”)
121. Beldiman, supra note 101, at 41.
122. Scientists Race to Patent SARS Virus, NBC NEWS (last updated Nov. 4, 2003),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3076748/ns/health-infectious_diseases/t/scientists-race-patent-sarsvirus/#.WC0OjfkrKM8.
123. See EDWARD HAMMOND, SOME INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES RELATED TO H5N1
INFLUENZA VIRUSES, RESEARCH, AND VACCINES, THIRD WORLD NETWORK 1, 8 (2009),
https://www.twn.my/title2/IPR/pdf/ipr12.pdf ("The changeable nature of influenza has led some research
groups, including at least one major company (Merck), to seek new influenza vaccines that do not rely
on particular HA or NA sequences. Others have laid claim to sequences and any other sequence that is
similar, for example, 90% or more of the same. At least one other has responded by attempting to patent
large numbers of varying HA and NA genes.”).
SEASONAL INFLUENZA AND GENETIC SEQUENCE DATA UNDER THE
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only problem with this, of course, is that the bonuses of virus patenting do
not go to industry collectively but to the companies with the power to patent
their inventions the quickest. As flu viruses, vaccines, and other technologies
become patented more frequently, patent thickets can emerge,124 making it
harder for small vaccine manufacturers to acquire all of the licenses
necessary to produce their own vaccines.125 Extending the PIP Framework
to seasonal flu, on the other hand, will create an open network of unpatented
seasonal flu viruses that will facilitate global flu research among all
manufacturers: not just the biggest corporations.
D. Public Health Argument 1: Unraveling Progress
One concern raised by a nonprofit organization called the Third World
Network was that expanding the PIP Framework to include seasonal
influenza would potentially undo WHO’s progress by requiring an overhaul
of the Framework itself.126 This concern was partially echoed by GISAID in
a 2016 PIP Framework commentary:
It should be remembered that agreement to the PIP
[Framework] was only possible by the exclusion of
seasonal influenza viruses, given the likely complications
and potential disadvantages [it would have created for] the
well-established operational GISRS sharing and benefit
system, and [the confusion it would have caused] between
epidemic seasonal influenza and the special health
emergency of an influenza pandemic.127
These comments suggest that there is general concern about expanding
the Framework, whether because there is a fear that parties will not agree to

124. Beldiman, supra note 101, at 35 (“[Patent thickets] result in a suboptimal functioning of the
patent system and exacerbate the natural process of narrowing of the number of players who place product
on the market. The end effect may be a single-player or even a no-player scenario at the commercialization
stage, a result that cannot support the Framework’s availability and affordability objectives.”).
125. See id. at 48.
126. WHO, 2016 Review Webcast, supra note 95, at 1:03:45.
127. GISAID’S COMMENTS ON THE PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF THE PIP FRAMEWORK REVIEW
GROUP
2016
(2016)
http://platform.gisaid.org/epi3/app_entities/entities/downloads/gisaid_comments_pip_rg_prelim_findin
gs.pdf.
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it or because changing the Framework could be difficult. These concerns,
however, seem to be speculative. The United States and Australia, for
example, have expressed openness to framework expansion discussion.128
Notably, there is a concern that laboratories would deal with significant
additional paperwork and tracking issues under an expanded Framework,129
but WHO partners can certainly look into building local GISRS tracking
infrastructure or crafting the extension in a way that makes tracking easier
or less cumbersome for seasonal flu strains than for pandemic flu.130
E. Public Health Argument 2: Not Strong Enough for the
Nagoya Protocol
The Nagoya Protocol is an international agreement adopted in 2010 that
commits countries to share genetic resources in a manner that promotes
access equity.131 It is unclear whether the PIP Framework might exempt
pandemic flu genetic material from the requirements of the Nagoya
Protocol.132 An industry representative at the August 2016 PIP Framework
meeting brought forth an argument against Framework expansion that was
connected to the Nagoya Protocol. She explained,
we do not think that including seasonal influenza into the
PIP Framework will solve the issue of [the] Nagoya
Protocol. First of all, it’s . . . [a] voluntary framework, so it
probably will not provide the legal certainty that might be
needed. Second of all, WHO GISRS could be elevated itself
to provide some level of certainty.133
This sentiment has been echoed elsewhere, and to some groups, the
question of the Nagoya Protocol is the main issue to consider in deciding

128. See EVIDENCE FOR SCOPING PAPER, supra note 116, at 8. Note that Norway, and potentially
other countries, appear to oppose PIP Framework expansion, although it is unclear whether this opinion
might change if the Framework were expanded in a way that would not overload GISRS. See id. at 8.
129. SCOPING PAPER, supra note 86, at 7.
130. See WHO, 2016 Review Webcast, supra note 95, at 1:04:22 (presenting a similar idea).
131. About
the
Nagoya
Protocol,
CONVENTION
ON
BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY,
https://www.cbd.int/abs/about/#objective (last visited Nov. 16, 2016).
132. SCOPING PAPER, supra note 86, at ¶¶ 18–19.
133. WHO, 2016 Review Webcast, supra note 95, at 53:19.
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whether or not to extend the PIP Framework to cover seasonal influenza.134
The idea that the PIP Framework could do more to approach the standards
of the Nagoya Protocol and generally explain the roles of participating
entities more clearly is certainly true. For example, the intellectual property
protections that the PIP Framework provides have been considered
ambiguous in recent scholarship,135 and those protections could be clarified
and strengthened.
However, strengthening the Framework to match the demands of the
Nagoya Protocol is a different (albeit related) issue than that of expanding
the Framework to include seasonal influenza. Perhaps the PIP Framework
can be simultaneously strengthened and extended to seasonal influenza. In
so doing, countries would not feel confused about which standards—the
Nagoya Protocol’s or the PIP Framework’s—would need to be followed in
donating different kinds of viral flu material to GISRS.136
F. The Marketing Argument: LMICs Don’t Care.
One of the other arguments brought up at the August 2016 meeting
against expanding the seasonal influenza framework was that “[i]n some
regions, there is really no demand” for seasonal flu vaccines.137 This
argument was echoed by Adam Kamradt-Scott and Kelley Lee, who
explained that major pharmaceutical companies are often located in wealthy
countries because LMICs are focused on more pressing illnesses than
seasonal flu and lack the money to purchase vaccines.138
In all practicality, though, as long as seasonal influenza kills vulnerable
populations around the globe, there will be a potential market for seasonal
influenza vaccines. And in countries like Madagascar, where a 2002 seasonal
flu epidemic “had a case-fatality rate of 3% as compared to <0.1% in other
influenza pandemics,” and the Congo, where an influenza outbreak had an

134. See, e.g., SEASONAL INFLUENZA COMMENTS, supra note 94, at 1, 3.
135. See Beldiman, supra note 101, at 40 (“The meaning of the term ‘materials’ in [SMTA 1] is
ambiguous: Does the prohibition against obtaining IP rights merely cover the sample’s physical layer or
does it extend to its informational layer, including its DNA structure?”).
136. See EVIDENCE FOR SCOPING PAPER, supra note 116, at S15.
137. WHO, 2016 Review Webcast, supra note 95, at 47:53 (stated by an industry representative).
138. Adam Kamradt-Scott & Kelley Lee, The 2011 Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework:
Global Health Secured or a Missed Opportunity?, 59 POLIT. STUD. 831, 836–37 (2011).
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even higher case-fatality rate among children under five years old, that
market condition is clearly being met.139
Therefore, if the market demand appears to be low, it is not due to a
lack of need but likely due to other problems, like a lack of awareness about
the benefits of the flu shot or insufficient funds to pay for one. The first can
be corrected through public health education, and the second by marketing
the vaccine at affordable rates. If WHO partners make an effort to educate
the public in developing nations about seasonal flu vaccines and find a way
to bring seasonal vaccines to them at prices they can afford, the public will
likely respond. In fact, as WHO notes, “an increasing number of low and
middle income countries situated in the tropics and subtropics have
considered introducing or expanding seasonal influenza vaccination in their
national immunization program.”140 And because the PIP Framework
essentially eliminates licensing fees tied to basic viral applications141 and
allows industry to contribute benefits to LMICs in a variety of ways, it should
be possible for industry to help find creative ways to provide vaccines in
these areas that are more reasonably priced.
In short, it is true that the PIP Framework is primarily a public health
tool for promoting fair and sustainable trading among nations. However, as
previously noted, a program that promotes global health also promotes
global economy, trade, and stability by extension. By expanding the PIP
Framework to include seasonal influenza, adjustments will definitely be
required. However, if negotiated appropriately, this effort could go a long
way toward improving the global vaccine industry, global health, and the
economy overall. Based on the arguments that have been discussed here,
WHO should consider extending the PIP Framework to include seasonal
influenza.
IV.

FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The question of whether or not to extend the PIP Framework to include
seasonal influenza is a simple one, in the sense that it will eventually be
resolved through a “yes/no” answer. However, in answering that question,
WHO will find itself asking others, such as: “How do we extend the

139. Africa
Flu
Alliance,
WORLD
HEALTH
http://www.who.int/influenza/preparedness/africa_flu/en/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
140. Influenza
Vaccine
in
Tropics
and
Subtropics,
WORLD HEALTH
http://www.who.int/influenza/vaccines/tropics/en/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2018).
141. See generally Beldiman, supra note 101, at 34.
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Framework?” “Should the Framework’s intellectual property protections be
improved generally?” And, “What is our philosophy moving forward on the
role of public health in international vaccine policy?” In this section, I will
briefly address each of these questions.
First, in extending the Framework, WHO would have some flexibility
in implementation: it could extend the PIP Framework itself or develop a
linked Framework just for seasonal influenza, it could add many seasonal flu
benefits sharing options to SMTA 2 or just a few, and it could choose
whether to implement the Framework’s changes all at once, in stages, or
through a pilot program.142
Second, while considering Framework extension, WHO will likely
consider strengthening and clarifying its IP protections as a whole. Dana
Beldiman has, for example, suggested creating patent pool systems within
the WHO network that cover vaccine-related technologies to prevent further
patent thickets from forming.143 Alternatively, an industry representative has
suggested building “certainty” into the Framework,144 and this could be done
in part by making the IP neutrality provision of the PIP Framework more
concrete.145 For example, the agreement could specify whether or to what
extent variations or derivatives of viral material can be patented by WHO
laboratories under SMTA 1. The discussion of how WHO should specifically
build upon its current IP framework is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, in general, if WHO does decide to move forward with PIP
Framework extension, it should consider extension an opportunity to make
the current flu virus sharing network more open and collaborative as a whole.
Third, in moving forward, WHO will need to reconsider its view on the
role that public health plays in vaccine agreements. The stakeholders that
WHO has worked with during this process have represented the needs of
business, research, and public health. However, the interests of these
stakeholders have frequently clashed in discussions. Obviously, WHO
cannot afford to ignore or discount any of these perspectives. However,
WHO, as an institution dedicated to public health, might do well to frame
future efforts in the IP arena as a promotion of long-term international
economic growth by promoting international health and well-being.

142.
143.
144.
145.

See WHO, 2016 Review Webcast, supra note 95, at 1:04:22 (a few of these ideas are expressed).
See id.; Beldiman, supra note 101, at 54–61.
WHO, 2016 Review Webcast, supra note 95, at 53:37.
See Beldiman, supra note 101, at 40.
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CONCLUSION
Intellectual property can be used as a tool to further important public
health and business goals simultaneously, especially in the global virussharing context. Seasonal influenza is a pervasive public health problem that
can have far-reaching effects on human life and on the economy. However,
laboratories within WHO can currently patent seasonal flu viruses, which
can create dangerous monopolies and roadblocks in vaccine research and
development. Protecting the open access nature of seasonal flu virus sharing
and providing seasonal flu donor countries with seasonal flu products,
licenses, and technologies can boost industry and protect global health.
WHO should consider not only extending the PIP Framework to seasonal flu
but also making its provisions stronger.

